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family_law:muslim-woman-maintenance

Maintenance under Section 125 CrPC and under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986

Section 125 of the Code confers power on a magistrate of the first class to direct a person having sufficient means but who neglects or refuses to maintain

  • (i) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or
  • (ii) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or
  • (iii) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself or
  • (iv) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself,

upon proof of such neglect or refusal, to pay a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, as the case may be, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole as such magistrate thinks fit.

Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered from the date of the application for maintenance. Section 126 of the Code prescribes the procedure for the disposal of an application made under section 125.

Section 127 of the Code provides for alteration of the rate of maintenance in the light of the changed circumstances or an order or decree of a competent civil court. Section 128 of the Code deals with the enforcement of the order of maintenance.

A reading of the above provisions shows that they are intended to provide for a preventive remedy for securing payment of maintenance which can be granted quickly and in deserving cases with effect from the date of the application itself.

In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and others1) entertaining an application under Section 125 of the Code, the learned Magistrate had granted monthly maintenance for a particular sum. It was enhanced by the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The core issue before the Constitution Bench was whether a Muslim divorced woman was entitled to grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Code. Answering the said issue, after referring to number of texts and principles of Mohammedan Law, the larger Bench opined that taking the language of the statute, it is held that there is no escape from the conclusion that a divorced Muslim wife is entitled to apply for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code and that mahr is not such a quantum which can ipso facto absolve the husband of the liability under the Code. It would not bring him under Section 127(3)(b) of the Code. The Parliament enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The constitutional validity of the said Act was assailed in Danial Latifi and another v. Union of India(2001) 7 SCC 740. The Constitution bench referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act. It upheld the constitutional validity of the Act. While interpreting Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, the Court came to hold that the intention of the Parliament is that the divorced woman gets sufficient means of livelihood after the divorce. Therefore, the word “provision” indicates that something is provided in advance for meeting some needs.

The Court stated thus: - “In other words, at the time of divorce the Muslim husband is required to contemplate the future needs and make preparatory arrangements in advance for meeting those needs. Reasonable and fair provision may include provision for her residence, her food, her clothes, and other articles. The expression “within” should be read as “during” or “for” and this cannot be done because words cannot be construed contrary to their meaning as the word “within” would mean “on or before”, “not beyond” and, therefore, it was held that the Act would mean that on or before the expiration of the iddat period, the husband is bound to make and pay maintenance to the wife and if he fails to do so then the wife is entitled to recover it by filing an application before the Magistrate as provided in Section 3(3) but nowhere has Parliament provided that reasonable and fair provision and maintenance is limited only for the iddat period and not beyond it. It would extend to the whole life of the divorced wife unless she gets married for a second time.”

While interpreting Section 3 of the Act, it was observed that the said provision provides that a divorced woman is entitled to obtain from her former husband maintenance, provision and mahr. She can recover from his possession her wedding presents and dowry. It authorizes the Magistrate to order payment or restoration of these sums or properties and further indicates that the husband has two separate and distinct obligations:

  • to make a “reasonable and fair provision” for his divorced wife; and
  • to provide “maintenance” for her.

The Court further observed that the emphasis of the section is not on the nature or duration of any such provision or maintenance but on the time by which an arrangement for payment of provision and maintenance should be concluded, namely, “within the iddat period”. The Act would exclude from liability for post-iddat period maintenance to a man who has already discharged his obligations of both “reasonable and fair provision” and “maintenance” by paying these amounts in a lump sum to his wife, in addition to having paid his wife’s mahr and restored her dowry as per Sections 3(1)(c) and 3(1)(d) of the Act.

Thereafter the larger Bench opined thus:-

30. A comparison of these provisions with Section 125 CrPC will make it clear that requirements provided in Section 125 and the purpose, object and scope thereof being to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can do so to support those who are unable to support themselves and who have a normal and legitimate claim to support are satisfied. If that is so, the argument of the petitioners that a different scheme being provided under the Act which is equally or more beneficial on the interpretation placed by us from the one provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure deprive them of their right, loses its significance. The object and scope of Section 125 CrPC is to prevent vagrancy by compelling those who are under an obligation to support those who are unable to support themselves and that object being fulfilled, we find it difficult to accept the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners.

31. Even under the Act, the parties agree that the provisions of Section 125 CrPC would still be attracted and even otherwise, the Magistrate has been conferred with the power to make appropriate provision for maintenance and, therefore, what could be earlier granted by a Magistrate under Section 125 CrPC would now be granted under the very Act itself. This being the position, the Act cannot be held to be unconstitutional.”

The larger Bench concluded that a Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife. It includes her maintenance as well and such a reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period. It must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3 of the Act. The liability of a Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3 of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to the iddat period; and that a divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain herself after the iddat period can proceed as provided under Section 4 of the Act against her relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death according to Muslim law from such divorced woman including her children and parents and if any of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance.

In Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P. and Ors2) the question arose whether a Magistrate is entitled to invoke his jurisdiction under Section 125 of the Code to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman. The Court ruled that subsequent to the enactment of the Act as it was considered that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 125 of the Code can be invoked only when the conditions precedent mentioned in Section 5 of the Act are complied with. The Court noticed that in the said case the Magistrate had returned a finding that there having been no divorce in the eye of law, he had the jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 125 of the Code. The said finding of the magistrate had been upheld by the High Court. The Constitution Bench ruled thus:

The validity of the provisions of the Act was for consideration before the constitution bench in the case of Danial Latifi and Anr. v. Union of India. In the said case by reading down the provisions of the Act, the validity of the Act has been upheld and it has been observed that under the Act itself when parties agree, the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C. could be invoked as contained in Section 5 of the Act and even otherwise, the magistrate under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced woman, and the parameters and considerations are the same as those in Section 125 Cr.P.C.. It is undoubtedly true that in the case in hand, Section 5 of the Act has not been invoked. Necessarily, therefore, the magistrate has exercised his jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C. But, since the magistrate retains the power of granting maintenance in view of the constitution bench decision in Danial Latifi's case (supra) under the Act and since the parameters for exercise of that power are the same as those contained in Section 125 Cr.P.C., we see no ground to interfere with the orders of the magistrate granting maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman.”

Thus the principle is that even an application has been filed under the provisions of the Act, the Magistrate under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced Muslim woman and the parameters and the considerations are the same as stipulated in Section 125 of the Code.

In Iqbal Bano Vs. State of U.P.& Anr3) the provisions contained in Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. was considered. The relevant portion of the order passed in Iqbal Bano's case reads as under:

10. Proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are civil in nature. Even if the Court noticed that there was a divorced woman in the case in question, it was open to it to treat it as a petition under the Act considering the beneficial nature of the legislation. Proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and claims made under the Act are tried by the same court.”

In Vijay Kumar Prasad Vs State of Bihar4) it was held that proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. are civil in nature. It was noted as follows:5).

In Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan6),the Appellant Shabana Bano was married to the respondent Imran Khan according to Muslim rites at Gwalior in the month of November in 2001. According to the appellant, at the time of marriage, necessary household goods to be used by the couple were given. However, despite this, the respondent-husband and his family members treated the appellant with cruelty and continued to demand more dowry. Sometime After, the appellant became pregnant and was taken to her parents’ house by the respondent. The respondent threatened the appellant that in case his demand for the dowry is not met by the appellant’s parents, then she would not be taken back to her matrimonial home even after delivery. Appellant delivered a child in her parental home. Since even after delivery, respondent did not think it proper to discharge his responsibility by taking her back, she was constrained to file a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the respondent in the Court of Family Judge, Gwalior. It was averred by the appellant that respondent has been earning a sum of Rs. 12 thousand per month by doing some private work and she had no money to maintain herself and her new-born child. Thus, she claimed a sum of Rs.3 thousand per month from the respondent towards maintenance. Rulings of the Court-

  • The court did hold that according to the Section 20 of the family act, which makes the situation crystal clear that the provisions of the Act shall have overriding effect on all other enactments in force dealing with the issue of maintenance,
  • The appellant’s petition under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as the appellant does not remarry.
  • The Quantum of Maintenance which will be awarded, according to the Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be restricted for the Iddat Period Only.

Even under the Act, the parties agreed that the provisions of Section 125 CrPC would still be attracted and even otherwise, the Magistrate has been conferred with the power to make appropriate provision for maintenance and, therefore, what could be earlier granted by a Magistrate under Section 125 CrPC would now be granted under the very Act itself. This being the position, the Act cannot be held to be unconstitutional. The appellant's petition under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as appellant does not remarry. The amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be restricted for the iddat period only.

In Shabana Bano vs Imran Khan placing reliance on Danial Latifi (supra) it is ruled that: -

The appellant’s petition under Section 125 CrPC would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as the appellant does not remarry. The amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125 CrPC cannot be restricted for the iddat period only.”

Though the aforesaid decision was rendered interpreting Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, yet the principle stated therein would be applicable, for the same is in consonance with the principle stated by the Constitution Bench in Khatoon Nisa (supra).

In Shamim Bano vs Asraf Khan Criminal Appeal No.820 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 4377 of 2012)decided on 16 April, 2014)) the Apex Court held:

17. Under these circumstances, regard being had to the dictum in Khatoon Nisa’s case, seeking of option would not make any difference. The High Court is not correct in opining that when the appellant-wife filed application under Section 3 of the Act, she exercised her option. As the Magistrate still retains the power of granting maintenance under Section 125 of the Code to a divorced Muslim woman and the proceeding was continuing without any objection and the ultimate result would be the same, there was no justification on the part of the High Court to hold that the proceeding after the divorce took place was not maintainable.”

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1)
1985 2 SCC
2)
2002 (6) SCALE 165
3)
2007 6 SCC 785
4)
2004 5 SCC 196
5)
SCC p.200, Para 14
6)
2010 1 SCC 666


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Created on 2021/02/02 14:55 by LawPage • Last modified on 2021/02/02 14:55 by LawPage